Policy Brief Vol. 5, No. 37:
September 26, 2002
On Alert for Agroterrorism
Be alert, but don't panic. This was the bottom-line message repeated often at a national conference I recently attended on agroterrorism.
In brief, agroterrorism is the use of a biological agent against crops, livestock or poultry. The agent could be any of wide range of pathogens, including anthrax, brucellosis or wheat rust.
Both U. S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and state departments of agriculture have ramped up planning for a terrorism act in the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001. By doing so, these agencies are better prepared to deal with a disease outbreak – natural or deliberate – than before.
Still, much remains to be done. Preparations will be enhanced over time as veterinarians and others in the private sector join the effort. Presumably, much of this planning will be folded into the mission of the soon-to-be-created Department of Homeland Security.
A response plan to an agroterrorist attack cannot be carved in stone. However, the general strategy should be to limit its geographic and financial impacts. At the first level, a threat might be countered at the individual plant or animal level. Vaccination is an example. The next level encompasses one or more farms where, for example, quarantines might be imposed. The third line of defense is at the regional level. Finally, in the worse scenario, a national plan for pathogen eradication and recovery must be in place.
A successful agroterrorist must have both the technical and organizational ability to create a devastating outbreak. The latter may be difficult than the former. The United States is a large country with agricultural operations scattered over hundreds, if not thousands, of miles.
Admittedly, though, as livestock and poultry feeding operations become more concentrated, the potential for havoc in local areas increases. Some diseases also take days or weeks for infections to develop – all the better for a terrorist plotting a stealth attack.
Defending U.S. borders against foreign agroterrorists is no easy task. Nor is it costless. Land-to-land borders with Canada and Mexico are especially challenging because of the great distances involved.
A recent National Research Council report highlights the difficulties. Less than 5 percent of travelers and imported products are subjected to a thorough inspection. In short, the chance of being caught with illegal products is not high. The NRC report also decried the insufficiency of USDA animal health laboratories in the event of a major outbreak.
Until these inadequacies are addressed, being alert to potential problems should be a high priority for every agricultural producer.
09/26/02-RF/VM Roy Frederick - Ph.D.
Agricultural Economics Professor (402) 472-6225
 
Vicki Miller Research Communications Coordinator (402) 472-3813
Department:
Agricultural Economics
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